The concept of active cyber defense has been proposed for years. However, there are no mathematical models for characterizing the effectiveness of active cyber defense. In this paper, we fill the void by proposing a novel Markov process model that is native to the interaction between cyber attack and active cyber defense. Unfortunately, the native Markov process model cannot be tackled by the techniques we are aware of. We therefore simplify, via mean-field approximation, the Markov process model as a Dynamic System model that is amenable to analysis. This allows us to derive a set of valuable analytical results that characterize the effectiveness of four types of active cyber defense dynamics. Simulations show that the analytical results are inherent to the native Markov process model, and therefore justify the validity of the Dynamic System model. We also discuss the side-effect of the mean-field approximation and its implications.
Introduction
The concept of active cyber defense (e.g., using the so-called "white" or "good" worms to identify and fight/kill the malicious ones) has been proposed for years. However, the exploration has primarily focused on legal and policy issues [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . On the other hand, active cyber defense has already happened in some sense (e.g., the Welchia worm attempted to "kick out" the Blaster worm from the infected computers [4, 9] ), and full-fledged active cyber defense is seemingly inevitable in the near future [6, 10, 11] . It is therefore more imperative than ever to systematically characterize the effectiveness of active cyber defense. In this paper, we initiate the theoretical study on this perspective of cyber security, with emphasis on addressing the following basic question: How effective is active cyber defense? Such characterization studies not only will deepen our understanding of active cyber defense, but also will help real-life decision-making (e.g., when to launch active cyber defense?) and even policy-making (e.g., whether or not to launch active cyber defense?).
Our Contributions
We formulate, to the best of our knowledge, the first mathematical model for characterizing the effectiveness of active cyber defense. The interaction between cyber attack and active cyber defense can be naturally modeled as a Markov process (Section 2). Unfortunately, we do not know how to tackle the native Markov process analytically because all the techniques we are aware of do not appear to be applicable (see Section 1.2 for discussions). We therefore simplify, via the mean-field approximation, the native Markov process model as a Dynamic System model that is amenable to analysis. In the Dynamic System model, we obtain a set of analytical results (Sections 4-6). We then use simulations to validate the accuracy of the Dynamic System model (Section 8). Simulations show that the analytical results derived from the Dynamic System model are inherent to the native Markov process model, and that the accuracy of the Dynamic System model, in terms of dynamics accuracy and threshold accuracy (which will be specified in Section 8), increases with the average node degree. Moreover, the analytical results lead to various insights, with some highlighted (informally) as follows:
• If neither the defender nor the attacker is superior to, or more advanced than, its opponent in terms of cyber combat power (Types I-II dynamics with a certain threshold), the effectiveness of active cyber defense will depend on (in some quantitative fashion we derive): (i) the attack-defense network structure, (ii) the initial security state of the attack-defense network, (iii) the attacker's and defender's combat-power, and (iv) the attacker/defender strategy. We also characterize the benefit to strategic attacker/defender that initially "occupies" the large-degree nodes. Specifically, we show: (i) when the attack-defense network structures are Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graphs, a strategic defender/attacker does not gain significant benefit; (ii) when the attack-defense network structures are power-law graphs, a strategic defender/attacker gains significant benefit. 1 Moreover, we obtain the following quantitative result: The benefit to strategic defender is maximized for the sub-class of power-law graphs with exponent γ = 2. These are described in Sections 4-5.
• If the defender is superior to (or more advanced than) the attacker in terms of cyber combat power (Type III dynamics), the defender can always use active cyber defense to automatically "clean up" (i.e., cure) the entire network, regardless of the attack-defense network structure and no matter whether the attacker is strategic or not. This suggests that cyber superiority could serve as an effective deterrence, and can be seen as a consequence due to the lack of a certain threshold in the combat power function. The explorations of Type III dynamics and its dual (i.e., Type IV dynamics) are described in Section 6.
• As discussed in Section 7, active cyber defense can eliminate the asymmetry that is an inherent weakness of reactive cyber defense, where the defender runs "anti-virus software"-like tools on each computer to detect and cure infections (which are caused by that the attacks/malwares penetrated the perimeter defense such as Firewalls). The cause of the asymmetry is that when the defense is reactive, the attack effect is automatically amplified by the network (a kind of "network effect").
We stress that the focus of the present paper is to characterize how effective active cyber defense is. This means that we should not make any significant restrictions on the parameter regimes and network structures. One important research problem, which is orthogonal to our focus and is not addressed in the present paper, is how to extract the model parameters and the attack-defense network structure for a given cyber system. In principle, the model parameters can be obtained by analyzing the strength and weakness of the attack and defense tools ("what if" analysis can be used in the absence of sufficient data), and/or by conducting experiments (in lieu of physical experiments) to observe the outcome of experimental cyber combats. The network structure can be derived from the cyber system configurations and security policies, which may restrict which computers can directly communicate with which other computers. The characterization results presented in this paper accommodate a large class of parameter and structure scenarios.
Related Work
We classify the related prior work based on two perspectives: one is centered on the problem that is under investigation, and the other is centered on the technique that is exploited to tackle the problem under investigation.
From the perspective of the problem under investigation, we note that all existing studies in both the mathematics literature and the physics literature are geared toward, in the terms of the present paper, characterizing the outcome of reactive defense under various parameter conditions (see for example [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] and the references there in). These studies substantially generalize the pioneering work of Kephart and White [24, 25] , which was based on homogeneous epidemic models in biological systems [26, 27, 28] . For example, even for the very recent work [21] , which studies the attack-defense dynamics between one defender and multiple attackers that fight against each other as well, the defense is still reactive. In contrast, the present paper introduces a new research problem, namely characterizing the outcome of active defense under various model parameter conditions (include the graph/network structure). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the active cyber defense problem mathematically, despite that the technical practice of active cyber defense has been discussed for years [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . This is so even though our active cyber defense model is reminiscent of the voter model (see, for example, [29, 30, 31, 32, 33] ), where each node can adopt the state of one of its random neighbors at each time step. However, the voter model corresponds to the special case of our active cyber defense model with linear combat-power functions (the concept of combat-power functions will be introduced later). In contrast, we study general nonlinear combat-power functions, which explain why the techniques for analyzing the voter model cannot tackle our active cyber defense model (see Section 2.2 for further discussions). Finally, it is worth mentioning that active cyber defense is different from automatic patching [34] because the attacker may have already compromised many computers, and that our active cyber defense model is different from the Moran process [35, 36] , which considers the mutation dynamics of homogeneous nodes.
From the perspective of the techniques that are exploited to tackle the epidemic problem with network structures [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] , there are mainly two approaches. The first approach is to use the mean-field approximation (e.g., [37] ). Our Dynamic System model is also based on mean-field approximation of a native stochastic process model. Mean-field approximation is a plausible first step in studying problems such as the stochastic active cyber defense process we introduce in the present paper. Nevertheless, we empirically characterize the accuracy of the mean-field approximations.
The second approach is to directly tackle the native processes that take place on network structures. This approach is more rigorous than the mean-field approximation approach, but is often pursued after establishing some understandings based on the mean-field approach. This approach is valuable not only because it can derive rigorous results, but also because it can (in)validate some results obtained via the mean-field models. For example, Ball et al. [19, 20] study the threshold behavior and the final outcome of the SIR (susceptible-infectious-removed) epidemic process on random networks with clusters (communities). They consider the SIR epidemic process in two steps: the SIR epidemic spreading within the clusters (local spreading) and then the SIR epidemic spreading cross the clusters. For their studies, it is reasonable to use the Branching process approximation because they only need to consider the case of small initial infections (i.e., early stage of epidemic spreading) and because the notion of offspring generation is well-defined in SIR models. They derive a rigorous central limit theorem under certain conditions. In another line of investigations, Berger et al. [15] investigate the SIS (susceptible-infectious-susceptible) Contact process [38] on random graphs that are generated via preferential attachment [39] . Their rigorous study confirms the threshold result of Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani [37] obtained via the mean-field approximation, namely that the epidemic threshold of scale-free networks is 0. Chatterjee and Durrett [18] further study both SIR and SIS models on random graphs with the power-law degree distributions. Improving upon some results in [18] , Mountford et al. [22] show that the epidemic extinction time for the Contact process on power-law random graphs grows exponentially in the number of nodes, and Mountford et al. [23] obtain bounds for the density of infected nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the native Markov process model and then show how to simplify it as a Dynamic System model that is amenable to analysis. In Section 3, we briefly review some background knowledge. In Sections 4-6, we characterize four types of active cyber defense dynamics. In Section 7, we explain why active cyber defense can eliminate an inherent weakness of reactive cyber defense. In Section 8, we use simulations to show that the analytical results derived from the Dynamic System model are inherent to the native Markov process model. In Section 9, we conclude the paper with future research directions. Lengthy proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Active Cyber Defense Model
A cyber system consists of networked computers/nodes of finite populations. A computer has two states: compromised or secure (i.e., vulnerable but not compromised). We may say that a compromised computer is "occupied" by the adversary/attacker, and a secure computer is "occupied" by the defender. The adversary can compromise a computer by exploiting its (e.g., zero-day or unpatched) vulnerabilities. Attacks are malware-like, meaning that the compromised computers can attack the vulnerable computers in an epidemic-spreading fashion. With active cyber defense, the defender can use "good worm"-like mechanisms to spread in networks (as the malicious worms do) to identify and "clean up" the compromised computers.
time Initial security state of an example cyber system Three example equilibrium security states of the cyber system Figure 1 : Illustration of cyber security state evolution under active cyber defense, where the same initial state may evolve, under different conditions, toward one of the three example equilibrium states -all nodes are secure (blue dots); all nodes are compromised (red dots); some nodes are secure. The core research issue is to characterize how the initial state, network topology, parameters and attacker/defender strategies would govern the evolution.
The interaction between cyber attack and active cyber defense formulates an attack-defense interaction structure, a graph topology that represents how the compromised nodes attack the secure nodes and how the secure nodes use active cyber defense to clean up the compromised nodes. We say a defender (attacker) is strategic if it initially occupies the large-degree nodes in the graph with higher probabilities. The attack-defense interaction leads to the evolution of cyber security state of the entire cyber system. We illustrate the state evolution in Figure 1 , where a blue dot means "secure" and a red dot means "compromised." As shown in Figure 1 , the state evolution can exhibit rich phenomena (e.g., the existence of multiple kinds of equilibria). At a high level, the research objective is to characterize how the evolution is governed by the initial state, graph topology, parameters and attacker/defender strategies. The characterization will allow us to answer some basic questions such as: under what conditions the cyber security state evolves toward the all-blue equilibrium?
The Native Markov Process Model
Formally, cyber attack-defense takes place over a finite network/graph structure G = (V, E), where V = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of nodes/computers and E is the set of edges/arcs with (u, u) / ∈ E (i.e., there are no self-loops in the setting of the problem). At any point in time, a node v ∈ V is in one of two states: blue, meaning that it is secure (i.e., vulnerable but not compromised by the attacker); red, meaning that it is compromised by the attacker. Node v's state changes because of some u, where (u, v) ∈ E. Note that (u, u) / ∈ E because a secure node will not clean up itself and a compromised node will not attack itself. Since our study applies to both undirected and directed graphs, we focus on undirected graphs while mentioning the difference when the need arises. We do not make any significant restrictions on G because in real-life G can have any topology. This has become a standard practice in characterization studies of cyber security (see, for example, [13, 14, 16, 17, 21] ).
The state of node v ∈ V at time t is a random variable ξ v (t) ∈ {0, 1}:
Correspondingly, we define
Denote byθ v,BR (t) the rate at which v's state changes from blue to red at time t, which is a random variable because it depends on the states of v's neighbors. Similarly, denote byθ v,RB (t) the random rate at which v's state changes from red to blue at time t. The state evolution of v ∈ V is naturally described as a Markov process (dubbed "Markov process model" or "Markov model" for reference purpose) with the following transition probabilities:
and
as ∆t → 0. Denote by N v = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E} the set of neighbors of node v ∈ V . Since the random rates θ v,RB (t) andθ v,BR (t) are naturally determined by the random states of node v's neighbors, we use deterministic but possibly nonlinear functions f RB (·) : R → [0, 1] and f BR (·) : R → [0, 1] to define respectively the random rates θ v,RB (t) andθ v,BR (t), as follows:
We call f RB (·) and f BR (·) the combat-power functions because they abstract the attacker's and defender's combat capabilities.
At this point, we do not know how to tackle the above native Markov process model. One may note that the above combat-power functions are reminiscent of the so-called Voter model [29] , where a node changes its opinion (or state) to the opinion of one random neighbor according to a fixed-rate Poisson process. This allows the model to be transformed into a dual process that works backward in time and becomes a random walk [29] , which makes it tractable. In contrast, in our model a node changes its state according to a rate that is not fixed but instead nonlinearly dependent up on the states of its neighbors. The nonlinearity prevents us from transforming our native Markov process model into a Random Walk model, meaning that the technique used in [29] cannot solve the problem we encounter. This nonlinearity-caused difficulty suggests us to simplify/approximate the native Markov process model as a tractable Dynamic System model.
Simplifying the Markov Process Model as Dynamic System Model
Now we show how to simplify the native Markov process model into a tractable Dynamic System model via the mean-field approximation. From Eq. (1), we have, for v ∈ V ,
which can be rewritten as:
Similarly, from Eq. (2) we can derive for all v ∈ V :
By letting ∆t → 0, we have for all v ∈ V :
Note that
By the idea of mean-field approximation, we can move the expectation inside the combat-power function, and replace the mean of random rateθ v,RB (t), denoted by θ v,RB (t), with the following term:
We can treatθ v,BR (t) analogously. As a result, we obtain the mean state-transition probability θ v,RB (t) and θ v,BR (t) as:
Therefore, Eq. (3) becomes the following Dynamic System model for all v ∈ V :
Note that the Dynamic System model for all v ∈ V encodes the graph topology via parameters θ v,BR (t) and θ v,RB (t), which encode the information about node v's neighborhood (including the states of node v's neighbors).
The corresponding state-transition diagram for any node v ∈ V is depicted in Figure 2 . 
Instantiating the Dynamic System Model via Specific Combat-Power Functions
Recall that combat-power function f RB (·) abstracts the defender's power against the attacker. It should satisfy the following properties:
increases monotonically. This is intuitive because the more blue nodes surrounding a red node, the greater the chance the red node will become blue (because of the active defense launched by the blue nodes). In this paper, we consider four types of f RB (·) with examples depicted in Figure 3 , where the first two types of f RB (·) have an inherent threshold while the others don't.
• Type I: For a given threshold σ ∈ (0, 1), we define
Intuitively, the defender is more powerful than the attacker when σ < 1/2, less powerful than the attacker when σ > 1/2, and equally powerful as the attacker when σ = 1/2.
• Type II: For a given threshold τ ∈ (0, 1), we define:
Moreover, f RB (·) is increasing and continuous in intervals [0, τ ) and (τ, 1]. This type of functions is known as "sigmoid" functions. Intuitively, the defender is more powerful than the attacker when τ < 1/2, less powerful than the attacker when τ > 1/2, and equally powerful as the attacker when τ = 1/2.
• Type III: f RB (·) is concave, continuous and increasing in [0, 1], f RB (x) > x for s ∈ (0, 1) and f RB (0) = 0, f RB (1) = 1. Intuitively, the defender is more advanced than the attacker (i.e., the defender has cyber combat superiority).
• Type IV: f RB (·) is convex, continuous and increasing in [0, 1], f RB (x) < x for x ∈ (0, 1) and f RB (0) = 0, f RB (1) = 1. Intuitively, the defender is less advanced than the attacker. Note that Type IV f RB (·) is dual to Type III f RB (·). 
Based on the above 4 types of combat-power functions, we focus on the 4 types of combat-function combinations that satisfy
By combining Eqs. (4) and (6), we obtain the following master equation for a single node v ∈ V :
The research task is to characterize Types I-IV dynamics, namely the dynamics of master equation (7) with Types I-IV combat-power functions, respectively. For example, for Type I combat-power function, we have
We want to characterize, among other things, the roles of the thresholds specified in Types I-II dynamics, and the consequences due to the lack of such thresholds in Types III-IV dynamics.
Summary of notations
Let R be the set of real numbers, P(·), E(·), Var(·) be the probability, expectation, and variance functions, respectively. Other major notations are summarized in the following table. G = (V, E) graph/network that abstracts a cyber system from a cyber security perspective, where
indicator of defender's relative combat-power in Types I and II dynamics, respectively ξ v (t) state of node v at time t: blue (i.e., 1 or "secure") and red (i.e., 0 or "compromised") B v (t) probability v ∈ V is blue at time t R v (t) probability v ∈ V is red at time t α α = 1 n v∈V B v (0), namely the average fraction of blue nodes at time t = 0 S random set of blue nodes at time t = 0 θ v,BR (t) probability that node v's state changes from blue to red at time t θ v,RB (t) probability that node v's state changes from red to blue at time t
Preliminaries Arbitrary Networks
By "arbitrary network" we mean a given network G = (V, E) that may or may not have a special structure/topology of interest. Most analytical results in this paper are derived from dynamic systems that take place on arbitrary networks. In general, such results are often independent of the statistical properties of the networks (e.g., the degree distribution).
In order to show the existence of the third kind of equilibrium illustrated in Figure 1 (i.e., some nodes in blue color and the other nodes in red color), we also consider a given network that has a cluster (or community) structure.
∅ for all i = j, and the nodes belonging to V i are better connected than the nodes crossing V i and V j for any i = j. More specifically, the special phenomenon is related to the minimum node expansion in cluster V k for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, which is defined as
Generalized Random Graphs
In order to characterize the benefit to the strategic defender who initially occupies the large-degree nodes with greater probabilities (a scenario that is often difficult to analyze), we propose to use the generalized random graph model [40] . This means that the result is applicable to a class of random networks (which however include the Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graphs and power-law random graphs [40] ), rather than arbitrary networks; this slight restriction is compensated with some valuable analytical results. (Characterizing the benefit to strategic defender in arbitrary networks is left as an open problem.) In the generalized random graph model, we are given an expected (in-)degree sequence
can be obtained by linking each pair of nodes (u, v) with probability
independent of the others [40] , where
For simplifying the analysis, we allow self-links while noting that our result can be adapted to accommodate that there are no self-links. In order to attain deeper insights, we will consider two instantiations of the generalized random graph model, namely the classic Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graphs with d 1 (n) = . . . = d n (n) or edge probability p = d 1 (n)/n, and the ubiquitous power-law random graphs with #{v∈V :deg(v)=k} #V ∝ k −γ for some γ > 0. Note that γ does not need to be greater than 1 because d max (n) is finite.
Note that complete graphs are a special case of arbitrary networks and of generalized random graphs. Since the theorems we present below hold either for arbitrary networks or for generalized random graphs, they automatically apply to complete graphs.
Characterizing Type I Active Cyber Defense Dynamics
In this section, we first characterize Type I active cyber defense dynamics with non-strategic defender in arbitrary networks, where the initial occupation probability B v (0) is identical to all nodes. We then investigate the more difficult case of strategic defender with degree-dependent B v (0) ∝ deg(v) in the generalized random graph model, where the defender initially occupies the large-degree nodes with higher probabilities (i.e., the large-degree nodes are appropriately better protected).
Characterizing Type I Dynamics with Non-Strategic Defender
Type I dynamics with non-strategic defender is characterized through Theorems 1-3. The characterizations include the conditions under which the defender can or cannot use active cyber defense to automatically clean up the entire network, and a method for deciding whether an equilibrium is stable. Theorem 1 requires the following Lemma 1, whose proof is omitted because it is similar to (and simpler than) the proof of Lemma 2 that is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 1 Consider Type I dynamics with threshold σ and system (7) in arbitrary network G = (V, E).
u∈Nv B u (t) > σ holds for all v ∈ V and t ≥ 0, and min v∈V B v (t) increases monotonically.
(ii) If
u∈Nv B u (t) < σ holds for all v ∈ V and t ≥ 0, and max v∈V B v (t) decreases monotonically.
Theorem 1 (a sufficient condition under which the defender or the attacker will occupy the entire network) Consider Type I dynamics with threshold σ and arbitrary network
Proof We only prove the first part because the second part can be proved analogously. According to Lemma 1, we know
u∈Nv B u (t) > σ for all t ≥ 0 and v ∈ V . This and Eq. (5) imply that θ v,RB (t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0 and v ∈ V . Thus, system (7) becomes
This leads to B v (t) = exp(−t)B v (0) + 1 − exp(−t) and thus lim t→∞ B v (t) = 1. Theorem 2 (a sufficient condition under which neither the defender nor the attacker will occupy the entire network) Consider Type I dynamics with threshold σ and arbitrary clustered network G = (V, E). Let B v (0) = α k for every v ∈ V k and β k be the minimum node expansion as defined in Eq. (9) .
As in Theorem 1, we have lim t→∞ B v (t) = 1.
As in Theorem 1, we have lim t→∞ B v (t) = 0.
Theorem 2, which applies to arbitrary networks with the cluster structure, leads to: , while Theorem 2 gives a condition under which another kind of stable equilibria exist (i.e., different clusters in different color). Because the stability of equilibria gives a high-level description of Type I dynamics (e.g., under what condition the global network security state evolves toward a particular equilibrium), we need some general method/algorithm to evaluate the stability of equilibria. This is addressed by the following Theorem 3, whose proof is deferred to Appendix A. Before presenting the theorem, we recall that an equilibrium B * is stable if there exists a neighborhood of B * such that every trajectory B(t) initially located in the neighborhood converges to B * . We say B * is a stable equilibrium with exponential convergence if for each B(t) in the neighborhood, there exist positive constants ̺ > 0 and M > 0 such that B(t) − B * ≤ M e −̺t for all t ≥ 0.
Theorem 3 (method/algorithm for determining stability of equilibria and their emergence rates) Consider Type I dynamics with threshold σ and arbitrary network
both B * andB * are asymptotically stable equilibria with exponential convergence.
(ii) If B * v = σ for some v ∈ V , B * andB * are unstable.
Recall that Theorem 1 says that the system has two equilibria: [1, . . . , 1] and [0, . . . , 0]. Since both equilibria satisfy condition (11), Theorem 3 says that the two equilibria are asymptotically stable with exponential convergence.
Characterizing Type I Dynamics with Strategic Defender
Now we investigate Type I dynamics with strategic defender, where the initial probability that node v is secure is proportional to its degree, namely B v (0) ∝ deg (v) . We analyze it in the afore-reviewed generalized random graph model [40] . This means that our analytical result (Theorem 4 below) is not necessarily true for arbitrary networks. We compensate this slight restriction with valuable analytical results, including the quantification of the benefits when the attack-defense network structures are ER graphs and power-law graphs. The basic idea behind the proof of Theorem 4 is to show that under the given conditions, the event
u∈Nv B u (0) > σ occurs almost surely. We accomplish this by using an asymptotical normal distribution, and by showing that the Lyapunov condition in the Central Limit Theorem and the Kolmogorov condition in the Strong Law of Large Numbers [41] are satisfied. The proof details are given in Appendix B.
Theorem 4 (outcome of active cyber defense with strategic defender) Let G(n) = (V (n), E(n)) be an instance of n-node random graph generated according to a given expected (in-)degree sequence (d 1 (n), . . . , d n (n)). Given the degree-dependent probability B v (0), we determine v's state according to B v (0) independent of anything else. Let S = {v : v ∈ V (n) ∧ B v (0) = 1} be the set of blue nodes in G(n) at time t = 0, and
If lim n→∞ φ(n) > σ holds almost surely, then lim n→∞ lim t→∞ B v (t) = 1 holds for all v ∈ V (n) almost surely, namely lim n→∞ P (lim t→∞ B v (t) = 1) = 1; if lim n→∞ φ(n) < σ holds almost surely, then lim n→∞ lim t→∞ B v (t) = 0 holds for all v ∈ V (n) almost surely, namely lim n→∞ P (lim t→∞ R v (t) = 1) = 1.
Note that Theorem 4 holds for generalized random graphs (rather than arbitrary networks), which however are not necessarily dense. To see this, we observe that a sufficient condition for assumption (v) is d min ≫ √ n because
These conditions do not imply that the graphs are dense. For example, the two conditions are satisfied by d v (n) = O( √ n log(n)) for all v ∈ V (n), which however implies that density of the graph converges to zero as n → ∞.
Theorem 4 corresponds to the case of strategic defender with B v (0) ∝ deg(v), and can be adapted to the case of strategic attacker with R v (0) ∝ deg (v) . In what follows we discuss the implications of Theorem 4 in these two cases separately, and then compare them to draw deeper/quantitative insights with respect to ER and power-law graphs.
Characterizing the qualitative benefit to strategic defender with
Then, the expected number of initial blue nodes is
where deg(v) is the (in-)degree of node v ∈ V (n). With respect to random set S of blue nodes at time t = 0, we define random variable χ v (S):
Theorem 4 implies the following: if
This means that a strategic defender can use active cyber defense to automatically clean up the entire network even if the defender initially occupies less than σ, but more than α threshold (≤ σ), portions of the network. This leads to: 
Characterizing the qualitative benefit to strategic attacker with
In this case, we have
Thus, the blue-node initial occupation threshold is 
Characterizing the quantitative benefit to strategic defender in ER graphs
For ER graphs with edge probability p, the degree distribution follows a binomial distribution B(n, p):
In the above we showed
As n → ∞, both α threshold and β threshold converge to the threshold σ. More specifically, [12] . Note however that in our model, the attacker aims to compromise nodes but does not delete any nodes.)
Characterizing the quantitative benefit to strategic defender in power-law graphs
Consider power-law graphs with exponent γ.
. By replacing the sum with integral in Eq. (16), we can define
This leads to four cases: γ / ∈ {1, 2, 3},
For γ = 1, 2, 3, we can reason in a similar fashion. As a result, we can define
Eqs. (19) and (20) reach maximum at γ = 2. This leads to:
Insight 6 For power-law graphs, the benefit to strategic defender/attacker is significant. (This is also reminiscent of, and in parallel to, the connectivity-based robustness of power-law networks, namely that power-law networks are easily disrupted by strategic deletion of large-degree nodes [12]. Again, in our model the attacker aims to compromise nodes but does not delete any nodes.) Moreover, the benefit to strategic defender is maximized for the sub-class of power-law networks with exponent γ = 2.

Characterizing Type II Active Cyber Defense Dynamics
Type II dynamics is similar to Type I dynamics, except the following: Type-I combat-power function is discontinuous near the threshold σ, whereas Type II combat-power function is continuous and differentiable near the threshold τ . For the case of non-strategic defender with node-independent B v (0), we obtain the following Theorems 5-7, which are in parallel to Theorems 1-3, respectively. Theorem 5 requires the following Lemma 2, whose proof is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 2 Consider Type II dynamics with threshold τ and system (7) in arbitrary network G = (V, E). (i) If
u∈Nv B u (t) > τ holds for all v ∈ V and t ≥ 0, and min v∈V B v (t) increases monotonically.
u∈Nv B u (t) < τ holds for all v ∈ V and t ≥ 0, and max v∈V B v (t) decreases monotonically.
Proof of the following Theorem 5, which holds for arbitrary networks, is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 5 (a sufficient condition under which the defender or the attacker will occupy the entire network) Consider Type II dynamics with threshold τ and arbitrary network G = (V, E). If
1 deg(v) u∈Nv B u (0) > τ for all v ∈ V , lim t→∞ B v (t) = 1 for all v ∈ V ; if 1 deg(v) u∈Nv B u (0) < τ for all v ∈ V , lim t→∞ B v (t) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
Theorem 6 (a sufficient condition under which neither the defender nor the attacker will occupy the entire network)
Consider Type II dynamics with threshold τ and arbitrary network G = (V, E) with the cluster structure. Let B v (0) = α k for every v ∈ V k and β k be the minimum node expansion as defined in Eq. (9) .
Proof of Theorem 6 is similar to proof of Theorem 2. Proof of the following Theorem 7 is given in Appendix E. Both theorems hold for arbitrary networks. (ii) If B * v = τ for some v ∈ V , B * andB * are unstable.
For the case of strategic defender with B v (0) ∝ deg(v), we can obtain a result for generalized random graphs in parallel to Theorem 4 via a similar proof. We omit the lengthy details. In summary, we have:
The preceding Insights 1-6 are equally applicable to Type II dynamics.
Characterizing Types III-IV Active Cyber Defense Dynamics
Types III-IV combat-power functions represent that the defender (attacker) is superior to, or more advanced than, its opponent. Due to the lack of threshold in the computer-power functions, an immediate consequence is that there is no difference between the case of non-strategic defender and the case of strategic defender. Further consequences due to the lack of threshold are characterized as follows.
Theorem 8 (characterizing Type III dynamics) Consider Type III dynamics in arbitrary network
(ii) Equilibrium B v (0) = [1, . . . , 1] is asymptotically stable with exponential convergence.
Part (i) of Theorem 8 can be proved as in the first half of Theorem 5. Parts (ii) can be proved in a fashion similar to Part (i) of Theorem 7. Parts (iii) can be proved in a fashion similar to Part (ii) of Theorem 7. Since Type IV dynamics is dual to Type III dynamics, from Theorem 8 we obtain: Theorem 9 (characterizing Type IV dynamics) Consider Type IV dynamics in arbitrary network G = (V, E). 
Advantage of Active Cyber Defense over Reactive Cyber Defense
Current cyber defense is mainly reactive, where the defender runs "anti-virus software"-like tools on each computer to scan and cure infections, which are caused by attacks/malwares that penetrated the perimeter defense (e.g., Firewalls). Reactive cyber defense inevitably causes an asymmetry that is advantageous to the attacker because the attack effect is automatically amplified by the network (a kind of "network effect"). Specifically, reactive cyber defense may be modeled using the well-known SIS (Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible) model, while accommodating arbitrary attack-defense network topologies. A sufficient condition for the spreading to die out is [16] :
where λ 1,A is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix corresponding to the attack-defense defense structure and is in a sense the average node degree or connectivity [42] , cure capability abstracts the defender's reactive defense power (i.e., the probability that a compromised node becomes a susceptible node at a single time step), and spreading capability abstracts the attacker's attack power (i.e., the probability that a compromised node successfully attacks a susceptible neighboring node at a single time step). This means that the attacker always benefits from rich connectivity because the attack effect is amplified by λ 1,A , which explains why the asymmetry phenomenon is advantageous to the attacker [43, 44, 45] .
On the other hand, Sections 4-6 show that the asymmetry disappears with active cyber defense because λ 1,A (or its like) does not play a role in the analytical results. This justifies one usefulness of the model-based characterization studies. In summary, we have:
Active cyber defense eliminates the attack amplification phenomenon, namely the asymmetry between cyber attack and reactive cyber defense.
Validating the Dynamic System Model via Simulation
The above characterizations of active cyber defense dynamics are based on the Dynamic System model, which is the mean-field approximation of the native Markov process model. Therefore, we need to show whether or not the analytical results derived from the Dynamic System model are inherent to the Markov process model.
Validation Methodology
Our validation methodology is centered on examining the dynamics accuracy and the threshold accuracy of the Dynamic System model. For examining the dynamic accuracy, we compare the mean blue occupation probability in the Dynamic System model, namely B v (t) = 
where the random rateθ v,RB is replaced with its mean θ v,RB as specified in Eq. (5). Simulation results are based on the average of 50 simulation runs.
(ii) Our numerical calculation in the Dynamic System model is based on Eq. (7),
In both cases, we set ∆t = 0.01. For examining the threshold accuracy, we study whether or not the threshold σ in the Dynamic System model is faithful to the threshold σ markov in the Markov process model. In order to to compute σ markov , we use the following numerical method. Since the convergence of ξ v (t) is probabilistic in a very small interval that contains σ, we define σ markov as the median value in that interval. Specifically, let a 1 be the smallest value such that an initial blue occupation greater than a 1 will cause all nodes to become blue in all 50 runs. Let b 1 be the largest value so that an initial blue occupation smaller than b 1 will cause all nodes to become red in all 50 runs. We set σ markov = a 1 +b 1 2 .
In our simulation, we use two kinds of graphs:
• ER random graph: It has n = 2, 000 nodes and independent link probability p = 0.02.
• Power-law random graph: It has n = 2, 000, exponent γ = 2.5, minimum node degree 2, and maximum node degree 120.
Dynamics Accuracy of the Dynamic System Model Overall dynamics accuracy
First, let us consider Type I dynamics and non-strategic defender with node-independent identical initial occupation probability B v (0). Second, let us look at Type I dynamics and strategic defender with
where S is the set of blue nodes at time t = 0. Inequality (17) indicates that if η > σ, all nodes will become blue; if η < σ, all nodes will become red. In our simulation, we set σ = 0.5. Figure 5(a) shows that in the ER graph, both B v (t) in the Dynamic System model and ξ v (t) in the Markov process model converge to 1 when η = 0.52 > σ = 0.5, and converge to 0 when η = 0.45 < σ = 0.5. Figure 5(b) shows that in the power-law network, both B v (t) and ξ v (t) converge to 1 when η = 0.45 (< σ = 0.5), and converge to 0 when η = 0.35 (far smaller than σ = 0.5). These confirm the phenomenon that is implied by Theorem 4, namely that the effect of strategic defense is not significant in ER networks but significant in power-law networks. In any case, the simulation results demonstrate that the phenomenon exhibited by the Dynamic System model is inherent to the Markov process model. Fourth, for power-law networks and strategic defender with B v (0) ∝ deg(d), we derived the sufficient condition |S| n > σ · h(z, γ) for lim t→∞ B v (t) = 1, meaning that in order for the defender to use active cyber defense to automatically clean up the network, the defender needs to occupy more than σ · h(z, γ) fraction of the nodes, which is minimum when h(z, γ) is minimum. As shown in Figure 7(a) , for fixed z, h(z, γ) is minimum at γ=2, which corresponds to the sub-class of power-law networks that maximize the benefit to the strategic defender. Figure 7(b) plots the simulation results in the Markov process model. We observe that σ markov is minimum at γ = 2 in the Markov model as well. These further confirm that the particular conclusion drawn in the Dynamic model -the benefit to the strategic defender is maximized for power-law graphs with exponent γ = 2 -is also inherent to the Markov process model. 
andθ v,RB (t) = 1 −θ v,BR (t) so as to be consistent with Eq. (6). It can be seen that if f RB (·) is convex, theñ
Analogously, if f RB (·) is concave, thenθ v,RB (t) ≤ θ v,RB (t). As a result, the above phenomenon can be explained as follows: For Types I-II combat-power functions, the dynamics in the Dynamic System model underestimates the dynamics in the native Markov process model when
u∈Nv ξ v (t) is below the threshold in the combatpower function, and overestimates the dynamics in the Markov process model when
u∈Nv ξ v (t) is above the threshold (see Figures 4-5 and Figures 6(a)-6(b) ). For Type III combat-power functions, which can be regarded as concave over the region [0, 1], the dynamics in the Dynamic System model overestimates the dynamics in the Markov process model (see Figures 6(c)-6(d) ). Analogously, for Type IV combat-power functions, the dynamics of the Dynamic System model underestimates the dynamics in the Markov process model (see Figures 6(e)-6(f) ).
Having explained the cause of the slight dynamic inaccuracy, we want to establish some deeper understanding of the inaccuracy. In particular, we want to know how the inaccuracy may be dependent upon the average node degree. For this purpose, we consider the following notion of relative error between the Dynamic System model and the Markov process model:
is the probability that node v is blue in the Markov process model, and B v (t) is the dynamic system state. To investigate the impact of average node degree, we fix the variance of the node degrees, denoted by dvar. Consider in the generalized random graph model with a given expected degree sequence that follows the power-law distribution. By fixing the variance dvar and the ratio r between the minimum and maximum expected degrees as d max = r * d min , we derive d min with respect to the varying power-law exponent γ from 1 to 6, as follows:
With r = 20 and dvar = 400, we obtain a series of generalized random graphs of 2,000 nodes. Although we cannot precisely fix the variance, the actual standard deviation of degrees for different γ's is quite stable: 20.47 ± 0.48. We run the Markov process model and the Dynamic System model on the random graphs to calculate the relative errors. We find, as shown in Figure 8 , that the relative errors decrease with the average node degree. 
Threshold Accuracy of the Dynamic System Model
Now we examine the accuracy of the Dynamic System model from a different perspective: threshold accuracy. That is, we examine the accuracy of the threshold σ derived from the Dynamic System model with respect to the threshold σ markov , which is numerically derived from the Markov process model. For the special case of Type III-IV combat-power functions, which have no threshold, we observe the following: For Type III combat-power functions, ifB v (0) > 0 for some nodes that can reach all other nodes, then lim t→∞Bv (t) = 1 for all v ∈ V ; For Type IV combat-power functions, ifR v (0) > 0 for some nodes that can reach all other nodes, then lim t→∞Bv (t) = 0 for all v ∈ V . To see this, we note that in the case of Type III combat-power functions, the following holds:
The case of Type IV combat-power functions can be treated analogously. However, the situation for Types I-II combat-power functions is very different as we elaborate below.
Threshold (in)accuracy for Types I-II combat-power functions: cause and characteristics
We illustrate the following threshold-drifting phenomenon with the specific f RB (·) in Type I dynamics for example. . We observe that Figure 9 (d) exhibits a pattern that is different from the others, which we cannot explain at the moment but we plan to investigate in the future. In all other cases, we observe the following: if σ < 0.5, then σ markov < σ; if σ > 0.5, then σ markov > σ. We call this threshold-drifting phenomenon, which indicates that the threshold σ in the Dynamic System model may deviate from the threshold σ markov in the Markov process model. What is the cause of the threshold-drifting phenomenon? In order to answer this question, let us define α = 1 n v∈V B v (0), namely the average fraction of blue nodes at time t = 0. The probability that k out of node v's deg(v) neighbors are initially blue is:
Suppose at each time step the occupation probability approximately follows the binomial distribution. For a random nodev, its expected degree is deg(v) and the probability thatv is blue is ν(t) = P{ξ v = 1} , with ν(0) = α. Now we consider the Dynamic System model. The mean of θv ,RB (t) is the probability that the actual number of blue neighbors is greater than σ · deg(v) . Denote this probability by θ σ (ν(t), deg(v) ). Then,
is integer. Hence, we can use the following equation to approximate the Markov process model:
This one-dimension differential equation has two stable equilibria, ν = 0 (i.e., all nodes are red) and ν = 1 (i.e., all nodes are blue). The critical value of the initial condition between the attracting basins ν = 0 and ν = 1 is the nontrivial solution of θ σ (ν, deg(v) ) − ν = 0, namely the solution other than 0 and 1 (which are the trivial solutions). The critical value in the Dynamic System model approximates σ markov . As shown in Figure 9 , σ markov = σ, which explains the threshold-drifting phenomenon.
Having explained the cause of the threshold-drifting phenomenon, we suspect that the degree of thresholddrifting also depends on the average node degree (more specifically, the threshold-drifting phenomenon disappears with the average degree). To confirm/disconfirm this, we compare in Figure 10 the threshold σ markov in the Markov process model and the threshold σ in the Dynamic System model, with respect to identical initial blue-occupation probability B v (0). In both ER and power-law graphs, we observe that σ markov asymptotically converges to σ as the average node degree deg(v) increases. Figure 10 : The greater the average node degree, the better the approximation of σ markov (blue curve) to σ (red line).
The implication of the threshold-drifting phenomenon is that the threshold σ may need to be adjusted in practice when σ > 1/2 (i.e., for some small ∆σ using σ markov = σ + ∆σ instead). For the case σ < 1/2, adjustment is not necessary because σ (> σ markov ) is sufficient for governing the dynamics toward the all-blue equilibrium (i.e., active cyber defense is effective for automatically cleaning up the network).
Conclusions
We presented the first mathematical model and characterization of active cyber defense dynamics. The analytical results give conditions under which (strategic) active cyber defense is effective, and lead to practical insights that can be adopted for decision-making and policy-making in real life.
Our study brings a range of interesting research problems, such as: How should we accommodate more sophisticated combat-power functions? How can we analyze strategic defender/attacker, including B v (0) ∝ deg(v) and possibly other scenarios, in arbitrary networks (rather than in the generalized random graph model)? How can we analyze the native Markov process model without using the Dynamic System approximation (while noting that the difficulty mainly lies in the nonlinearity of the combat-power functions)?
A Proof of Theorem 3
Proof For (i), note that equilibrium of Eq. (7) satisfies
Consider a small perturbation B(0) = B * v + δB. If B * v = 1, then θ v,RB (0) = 1 and B v (t) increases toward 1; if B * v = 0, then θ v,RB (0) = 0 and B v (t) decreases toward 0. In any case, the sign of
u∈Nv B u (t) − σ in a small time interval [0, t 0 ) for some t 0 is unchanged. Let t 1 be the maximum time at which all the signs of
u∈Nv B u (t) − σ are respectively the same as the signs of
u∈Nv B u (0) − σ. If t 1 is finite, then all signs in a small time interval starting at time t 1 are respectively the same as the signs at time t 1 . This implies that t 1 = +∞. So, the sign of
u∈Nv B u (t) − σ is the same as the sign of
u∈Nv B u (0) − σ for all v ∈ V , which implies that the system is asymptotically stable.
To see thatB * is also an equilibrium, consider the dynamic behavior of R v (t) in Eq. (7), namely
Since B v (t) + R v (t) = 1 always holds for all v,B * is an equilibrium of (11) and thus an equilibrium of (7). To see the rates of convergence to the above equilibria, we note θ v,BR (t) = 0 or 1 for all t and v ∈ V . Thus, (7) becomes either
In any case, the convergence rate is O(exp(−t)).
For (ii), we first note that the definition of Type I combat-power function implies θ v,RB ∈ {0, 1, σ}. Suppose at equilibrium B * that B * v k = σ for v k ∈ V 1 = {v 1 , . . . , v r }, where 1 ≤ k ≤ r. In other words, for any v ∈ V \ V 1 , we have B * v ∈ {0, 1}. For any ǫ > 0, it is always possible to find a sufficiently small δB from a set of positive Lebesgue measures and impose perturbation near B * : B * * = B * + δB such that δB < ǫ and
By treating B * * as the initial security state at time t = 0, there exists a time interval [0, t 0 ) such that
• for any node v with B * v = σ, B v (t) monotonically strictly increases toward 1 for t ∈ [0, t 0 );
• for any node v with B * v = 1, we have B v (t) = 1 for t ∈ [0, t 0 );
• for any node v with B * v = 0, B v (t) does not decrease for t ∈ [0, t 0 ).
Since for any v with B * * v = σ, we have B v (t) → 1 as t → ∞, B * with B * v = σ for some v is unstable.
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof From condition lim n→∞ φ(n) > σ, for almost every sequence of φ(n) we can pick some µ > µ ′ > 0 such that φ(n) > σ + µ > σ + µ ′ for sufficiently large n. Recall random variable χ v (S):
Note that P(χ v (S) = 1) = B v (0). Let ζ vu be a random variable indicating the link between (from) node u and (to) node v, namely
According to Eq. (10), we have
Since we assumed that the B v (0)'s are independent of each other and also independent of the linking of edges in G(n), ζ vu and χ u (S) are independent with respect to u. Our goal is to estimate the probability of event A v as defined by
Note that random variables ζ vu for all u ∈ V (n) are independent of each other. Its expectation is E(ζ vu ) = p vu (n) and variance is Var(ζ vu ) = p vu (n)(1 − p vu (n)). Because E(χ u (S) · ζ vu ) = B u (0)p vu (n) and the random variable has only two states, we have
with q n,v defined in Eq. (13) . This guarantees the Lyapunov condition in the Central Limit Theorem (with δ = 1) [41] . So, as n → ∞,
in distribution uniformly, as n → ∞. We call this asymptotic normal random variable φ v . In addition, we observe that
with w n,v defined in Eq. (14), with probability 1, because the term
converges to the standard Gaussian random variable owing to the Lyapunov central limit theorem where the Lyapunov condition is guaranteed by assumption (ii), noting g n,v , defined in Eq. (15) , denoting the third order moment of ζ v,u for all u ∈ V (n), and because
as n → ∞, owing to assumption (iii). Furthermore, we observe that
almost surely, because
converges to the standard Gaussian random variable, owing to the Lyapunov central limit theorem where the Lyapunov condition is guaranteed by assumption (iv), and
owing to assumption (iii). We further observe that
converges to the standard Gaussian random variable, owing to the Lyapunov central limit theorem where the Lyapunov condition is guaranteed by assumption (v), and
owing to assumption (iii). Combining (23) , (24), (25) and (26) with the fact
we conclude that there exists a random variable ǫ n,v that converges to zero uniformly with probability 1 such that
Finally, we observe that σ − φ(n) ≤ −µ holds with probability 1. This inequality, together with the convergence rate in the Central Limit Theorem [46] , implies
sn,v , noting µ ′ < µ, for sufficiently large n, Φ(·) is the probability function of the standard normal distribution, and C is a universal constant.
Since
we have
Under assumption (iii), the supra-limit of the logarithm of the right-hand side of Eq. (27) becomes:
This implies v∈V (n) Φ (t n (v)) → 0 as n → ∞. In addition, we observe that
converges to zero owing to assumption (vi).
Putting the above together, we have
By applying Theorem 1, for each event not belonging to v A v , we have lim t→∞ B v (t) = 1 for all v ∈ V (n). This proves the first part of the theorem.
Analogously, we can prove the second part. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Lemma 2
Proof We only prove part (i) because part (ii) can be proved analogously. In order to simplify the presentation, let
u∈Nv B u (t) be the average portion of v's blue neighbors at time t. First, we need to show that Y v (t) > τ holds for all v ∈ V and t ≥ 0. For this purpose, we let τ * > τ such that Y v (0) > τ * holds for all v ∈ V , and show that Y v (t) > τ * holds for all t ≥ 0. We observe that Y v (t) > τ * holds in a small time interval starting at time t = 0 because of the continuity of the B v (t)'s with respect to t. Let t 1 be the first time at which min v∈V Y v (t) = τ * , namely
We show t 1 = +∞ as follows. Suppose t 1 < +∞. We claim that min v∈V Y v (t) is non-increasing in an interval starting at time t 1 ; otherwise, d(min v∈V Yv(t)) dt > 0 in a small interval starting at time t 1 and min v Y v (t) > τ * in the small interval, which contradicts the definition of t 1 .
Let V * = arg min v∈V Y v (t 1 ). For each v ′ ∈ V * , we have
owing to τ * > τ . Hence, min v Y v (t) is strictly increasing in an interval starting at time t 1 . This contradicts that min v∈V Y v (t) is non-increasing in an interval starting at time t 1 . The contradiction was caused by the assumption t 1 < +∞. Therefore, we have t 1 = +∞.
Second, we need to show that min v∈V B v (t) increases monotonically. Let V t = {u : B u (t) = arg min v B v (t)}, which may not be a singlet. For t = 0, the given initial condition We now show that t 2 = +∞. Suppose t 2 < +∞, meaning that min v B v (t) is not strictly increasing at t = t 2 . However, for each v 2 ∈ V t 2 , we have
u∈Nv 2 B u (t 2 ) > τ and f RB (s) > s for all s > τ . This implies that min v B v (t) strictly increases at t = t 2 , which contradicts the definition of t 2 . Therefore, t 2 = +∞, namely min v B v (t) strictly increases for all t ≥ 0.
D Proof of Theorem 5
Proof We prove the first part as the second part can be proved analogously. Lemma 2 shows that min v B v (t) monotonically increases, meaning that lim t→∞ min v B v (t) exists. In order to show lim t→∞ B v (t) = 1 for all v ∈ V , it suffices to show lim t→∞ min v B v (t) = 1. Suppose lim t→∞ min v B v (t) < 1. There are two cases, but both cause contradictions as we elaborate below. Therefore, we have lim t→∞ min v B v (t) = 1.
Case 1: τ < lim t→∞ min v B v (t) < 1. There exist τ < τ 1 < τ 2 < 1 and T > 0 such that τ 1 ≤ min v B v (t) ≤ τ 2 for all t ≥ T . Since f RB (x) − x > 0 for all x ∈ [τ 1 , τ 2 ] and is continuous, we can find some δ > 0 such that f RB (x) − x > δ for all x ∈ [τ 1 , τ 2 ]. Let V t be the index set of arg min v B v (t). For each v * ∈ V t , we have
for all t > T . This leads to This means that there is a time interval [0, t 0 ) in which for any node v with B * v ≥ τ , B v (t) monotonically strictly increases. For any node v with B * v < τ , we have
which means that the corresponding B v (t)'s strictly decrease for a small time interval t ∈ [0, t 0 ). In summary, for any small perturbation with (29) as the initial security state, B v (t) leaves the equilibrium. Therefore, B * with B * v = τ for some v is unstable.
